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ABSTRACT
This paper looks at the dilemma between the values
in the concepts of punishment and nonstigmatization
as evidenced in the Massachusetts juvenile justice
system and child welfare system. The source of this
dilemma is in the historical attitudes toward the
delinquency and dependency of children.
The laws re delinquents and dependent children
(i.e., 1973 "CHINS ACT" Chapter 1073, Chaptersl119
and 120 of Massachusetts General Laws) do not force a
resolution of the value choices nor proffer an
explication of the ambiguous usage of the terms
stigmatization and punishment in the statement of
goals and values. One instance where the dilemma
manifests itself is in the placement of delinquents
and "Children in Need of Services" (previously the
historically defined "dependent" children or the status
offenders who were labeled "wayward", "stubborn child,"
"truant", "runaway") in group home facilities shared by
them. This paper looks at two group homes which try to
meet the goal of "nonstigmatizing their residents yet
forced to also function for the goal of punishment;
two goals which can not be accomplished simultaneously.
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INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts juvenile justice system has been
aceused of being inefficient at its best and a sham at
its worst because of the conflict between its legis-
lated purposes and goals and those implied by its
administrative design and organizational structure.
There was extensive reorganization of the formal system
in 1969 to align it. closer to its purposes and ideal.
And in 1973 the "CHINS" (Children in Need of Services,
Chapter 1073) Act was passed in response to the
increasingly popular hypothesis that delinquent tenden-
cies in children could be further encouraged 'and
propagated by stigmatization, a hypothesis derived
from Lemert's theory of secondary deviation. 1 These
actions of 1969 and 1973 brought into conflict the values
represented by the history of Massachusetts' attitudes
toward "dependent" children,2 toward delinquent
children and toward the historic functions of punish-
ment and of the juvenile justice system; and the
values represented by the currently popular ideas of
juvenile justice reform. The dissatisfaction with the
present juvenile justice system results from the
nonresolution of the state legislature's dilemma
between these values.
In the first chapter the concepts and conflicting
values which, form the dilemma are discussed. The
concepts are those of punishment and stigmatization and
the conflicting values are expressed in the competing
definitions of punishment and in the confusion of the
definitions of punishment and stigm. The second
chapter explains how the present understanding of these
concepts and values have evolved within the Massachu-
setts juvenile justice system. An overview of the
formal goals and purposes as stated in the,
Massachusetts state laws pertaining to the plight of
"dependent" children and to the commission of delin-
quent acts by juveniles is presented in the third
chapter. The fourth chapter presents an example of
how and where the goals and the laws of child welfare
and juvenile justice can contradict. The data was
gathered from interviews at two group homes, the
Department of Youth Services (DYS) and the Division
of family and Child Services (DFCs), and from what
published data the agencies made available to me.
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Chapter 1
"Concepts of Punishment and Stigmatization"
The definitions of punishment and of stigmati-
zation, and the justifications for punishment are
often confused. A justification for punishment is
frequently substituted as a definition and vice-
versa. H. L. A. Hart, in his "Principles of Punish-
ment,"3 and Anthony Flew, in his "The Justification
of Punishment," 4 define a standard or central case
of "punishment" in terms of five elements:
(1) it must involve pain or otherwise unplea-
sant consequencies;
(2) the pain has to be inflicted for an offense
legal rules;
(3) the pain must be inflicted on the person(s)
believed to be guilty;
(4) the guilty person must receive the punishment
from a personal agent; that is, natural
penalties or acts of God are not considered
under this definition;
(5) the personal agent must be an authority
constituted by the legal system against
which the crime was committed.
3
Stigmatization is sometimes taken to be synony-
mous with punishment. Yet often their congeneric
aspects are denied or ignored; such is the case
when a society claims to "punish" without stigma-a
tizing. Stigma is any mark or label of disgrace
indicating deviation from some norm or standard.
Stigmatization is a socialization, that general
process by which status and role transitions take
place. Individuals experience varying degrees of
personal differentiation by a process of degradation
in which (1) both event (offense) and perpetrator
are proved extraordinary; (2) uniformity of the
offense and perpetrator is emphasized, while the
dissimilarity of the offense and offender to the pre-
ferred event and person is enunciated; (3) the dig-
nity and suprapersonal values of society are salient
and accessible to view; (L) the denouncer is invested
with the right to speak in the name of these ultimate
values; (5) the denouncer is seen as a supporter of
these values; (6) witnesses and denouncer are
presumed to be alike in essence.
Stigmatization serves the purpose of reinforcing
the bonds of conformity to society's values. The
deviant behavior is considered detrimental to the
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continuance of the society, therefore the offender must
be made known to be not a full status member of that
society; society's values and ultimate goals are made
to look desireable, so that others feel the deviant
behavior must be cast out and not repeated by them-
selves; because the others want to belong to the
group. Stigmatization is a form of casting out the
deviant person by redefining the offender's self
(as being inherently different), reinterpreting his
past experiences so that the offender's non-membership
in the group becomes salient to view by group members.
Punishment can be incorporated into stigmatization.
But stigmatization is not necessarily punishment.
Primarily stigmatization is seen as a natural reaction
by members of the group and is seen as occurring without
formal guidelines. Punishment can be viewed as a
mechanism for reinstating the stigmatized person into
society.
Some theorists attempt to justify punishment as
a formal device for retribution, expiation or retaliation.
This theory sees vengeance as a natural desire that will
be expressed. The formal procedure of criminal law is
a more rational expression of the primitive demand for
public vengeance. Attempts have been made to rationalize
this "primitive demand" for vengeance as a need to bring
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about a state of affairs in which it is as if the wrongful
act had never happened. Vengeance serves to annul the
wrongful act.6 This theory could then be extended to
say that with the annulment of the transgression, the
offender is reinstated into society. In this way it
can be said that although punishment may be a part of
stigma, the punishment can serve as a formal way of
also removing that stigma.
Another theoretical justification for punishment
is deterrence. Sometimes deterrence is thought to be
the only justification for punishment; and at other
times it is said to be secondary, that of reprobation
being primary. However, in explicating this theory, the
purposes of law can be confused with the purposes of
punishment. The law is passed as a deterrent to be-
hairior that is socially unacceptable. And few believe
that for such laws as against suicide and adultery that
punishment has any deterrent effect on others and the
consequent diminution of the number of offenses.
.Supporters of the theory of punishment as deterrence
have a wide spectrum of views on deterrence from that
of not needing to justify punishment (as a deterrent)
by proving that it always prevents crime by its
deterrent quality ("It is enough to indicate there
would be more crime if all punishment were abolished. "7 )
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to that of "scientifically" determining the most effi-
caceous means of using punishment to deter even if it
moans "punishing" innocent people, or requiring the
severest penalties for offenses of impulse or passion
since such offenses can only be prevented by a penalty
greater than is needed to prevent deliberate offenses.6
The justification of punishment as rehabilitation9
falls under that of deterrence; for rehabilitation
supposedly assures the non-repetition of crime by the
"rehabilitated" offender. Critics of this justification
feel that to aim for deterrence through rehabilitation
is futile if the causes of crime are looked upon as
determined by the life of certain groups, and if the
rehabilitation concept deals with the individual as
if he were a self-sufficient and self-determing system.
It is felt that the rehabilitation concept can only
work If applied to a whole social group or, if in
adapting the individual completely to the dominant
social group and conditions.10 And by what scale of
values would the end of therapy be determined? Can
perfect beings be created? And then, what of the rest
of society? These questions consternate the advocates
of rehabilitation.
Bound up with these theories of deterrent and
7
rehabilitative purposes of punishment are values of
equity and utility. It has been argued on the theories
of rehabilitation and deterrence that there should be no
punishment for one who is no longer capable of doing
harm. This argument stems from a utilitarian yet
humanistic view of punishment. But it also ignores the
utilitarian consideration that punishment, even in this
case, may deter all others who may be tempted to commit
similar offenses even under conditions not quite the same.
Humanists feel that to punish a man because he deserves
it and as determined to be equitable in proportion to
his crime is mere revenge, barbaric and immoral. 1
Punishment can be perverted into cruelty or therapy if
reformation or deterrence are allowed to become independ-
ent ends; to those who advocate a retributive purpose for
punishment, they (reformation or deterrence) are only
acceptable as aspects of the retributive act, annulment
and negation.1 2 Some consider the theories of deterrence
and rehabilitation to be more humanistic than that of
reprobation and retribution. However, utilitarians
can carry the cause of deterrence to an extreme which to
them may seem humanistic in a broad sense or regards
benefit to society, but can seem cruel as regards
individuals. To these utilitarians, whatever may
8
serve the purpose of deterrence must be carried out,
be it "punishment" of an innocent or whatever may
serve the purpose of "rehabilitation, be it life--
long incarceration of an alcoholic or a lobotomy
performed on a "compulsive" offender. There are those
who feel offenders should be made to suffer no more
and no less than the amount of suffering which may
have been caused by them. Yet punishment can have dif-
ferent aims for different crimes.
Notice that in none of these definitions is it
possible to have punishment without stigmatizing the
individual receiving the punishment. In retribution,
this assertion is clear. In deterrence. it may not
be so clear. This is because deterrence can be seen
either as applying to individuals who have erred and
can be deterred from erring in the future, or as
applying to individuals who may or may not have erred
and are made examples of or "sacrificed" to deter those
who have not yet erred. In the former, all conditions
for stigmatization are met. The latter case does not
necessarily meet all the conditions in the standard
definition of punishment. (Confer the definitions of
stigmatization and puishment.)
Each of these definitions of punishment discussed
9
in this chapter are present to some extent in the
current Massachusetts juvenile justice system and
can be traced to historical attitudes of Massachussets
and much of America, and much earlier, of England,
toward criminality. It is in the second chapter
that we look at how these have evolved within the
Massachusetts juvenile justice system.
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Chapter 2
Stigmatization and Punishment as Expressed in
Historical Attitudes by Massachusetts Toward
Child Welfare"
The dilemma which frustrates Massachusetts'
efforts to deal with juvenile delinquency has evolved out
of the history behind the roles, and the attitudes of
which these roles are indicative, performed by the
state agencies Division of Family and Child Services
(DFCS) and Department of Youth Services (DYS). The
Division of Family and Child Services is responsible
for status offenders who are designated as Children in
Need of Services (CHINS) as well as children eligible
for welfare and social security benefits. However,
the Division of Family and Child Services falls under
the auspices of the state's Department of Public
Welfare. The Department of Youth Services is respon-
sible for those youthful offenders adjudged "delinquent."
It is a state department unto itself, and is in the
Governor's Executive Office. Legal doctrines about
juvenile delinquency had a separate historical beginning
and development from legal doctrines concerning "de-
pendent" children. The stigma of destitution and that
of deviance, both commonly acknowledged and conspicuous,
were separate realities in the 18th and early 19th
centuries. Toward the latter part of the 19th century
11
the two distinct perceptions of delinquent children and
?dependent children began to merge into one of that of
the child in trouble. As these perceptions changed,
so did the stigma attached to being poor, destitute
or delinquent, and so did the role(s) and forms of
"punishment" as incorporated into the stigma of being
delinquent change.
Before the twentieth century, much of American law
and legal philosophy, and especially that of
Massachusetts, was adapted from that of English common
law. Punishment was viewed as a way of reifying the
conceptual relationship between sin and suffering.13
The criminal was held responsible for his actions; no
notion of "diminished responsibility", (such as
suggesting leniency and reduced sentences by reason
of defendant's insanity, etc.), was established before
1843, the McNaghten Case, under English common law.3
4
Though common law demanded that both minor and adult
alike be punished for infractions,15 American nineteenth
century legal doctrines and sentencing policies did
make allowances for the immaturity and disabilities of
children. Laws were enacted specifying the minimum ages
at which a youth was to be held responsible for certain
crimes; age seven years at common law in some states,
and ten in others, with a chance for leniency up to the
12
age of twelve years if mentally and morally immature.
But, the law did not differentiate between the adult and
the minor who had reached the age of criminal responsi-
bility. The gradual development, beginning in the
mid-1800's, of an attitude which differentiates between
the criminal responsibility of an adult and that of a
minor occurred largely due to the rise of social reform
and the questioning of what are and ought be the
"functions" of punishment.
The toying with ideas of "other" "functions" of
punishment was one consequence of the nineteenth
century social reformers' quest for solutions to the en-
suing problems of the industrial revolution. The awe-
some amount of suffering entailed upon urban life due
to overcrowding, filth, disease, destitution,
unsupervised and uncared-for children received the
attention of the social reformers. These problems were
most evidenced within the city's debt prisons, poor-
houses, and jails. Children made up much of the popula-
tion of the latter institutions. This was apparently
due to (1) the peasant class women having left the
rural with their families to comprise part of the
industrial labor force, with the result of children
being neglected, (2) the tremendous overcrowding and
13
poverty in which many families were incapable of
properly caring for children. The common law
presumption that parents would perform their natural
duty, and the interpretation of the fourteenth amend-w
ment to the Constitution as protectng the "natural right
of a parent to the custody of his child from state
intervention without due process of law" both tended
to restrict the court's assumption of custody of cases
where it was necessary in order to prevent injury due
to neglect or maltreatment to the child.16 So, little
protection was assured to children whose distress was
mostly not of their own causing, even less or no pro--
tection was assured to those needy children whose
distress was compounded by their own delinquent acts.
Public care of dependent children1 7 took the form of
committing them to county almshouses as were impoverish-
ed adults. Dependent children who received State
attention via criminal acts were placed in jail, as
were offending adults. Sadly, dependent children often
only received State attention in response to delinquent
acts because of the two reasons stated above.
Between 1850 and 1870 the almshouse system was
supplemented by private organizations and "rescuing"
societies. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
14.
to Children, founded in 1875, afforded "organized
protection for dependent children" and "provisions
of an official character for the prosecution of
parents or otherwise who ill-used or brutally
treated the young and defenseless."18 In 1869, for
the first time, a law was inacted which extended the
authority of a Massachusetts state agency over both
delinquent and dependent children. The State Board of
Charities was charged to attend the hearing of any child
on trial in a criminal court, and to arrange care for him
with a private family instead of commitment to a reforma-
tory, if this was in the child's interest, and to visit
him at intervals.1 9 By 1875, Massachusetts had estab-
lished county homes and institutions for dependent
children. But, dependent children continued to be com-
mitted to the city's overseers of the poor (often the
State Board of Charities) who supervised the almshouse
system.
It began to be a common opinion that orphaned and
unsupervised children were liable to become delinquents.
As early as 1847, the first rural training school in
Massachusetts was opened because the state legislators
felt that cities bred crime, and that youthful offenders
should be removed from their environment to be
"rehabilitated" in the country. The rural training
school was the predecessor to the reformatory system
that was well established within the state by the 1870's.
Social reformers, philosophers, penologists developed
the idea of the reformatory as a special form of prison
discipline for adolescents and young adults. The
reformatory concept was based on principles formulated
by Britishers Matthew Davenport Hill,20 Alexander
Maconochie, Walter Crofton, and Mary Carpenter21:
indeterminate sentencing, the "mark" system, and "organ--
ized persuasion" rather than "coercive restraint."2 2
Although challenged in the 1860's by a few state
legislators, the reformatory concept stood the test of
time in Massachusetts as training schools such as the
Lancaster Industrial School for Girls and the Shirley
Industrial School, the likes of which were referred to
as "institutions of reformation" in the late 1800's,
operated well into the 1960's. The youths committed to
these training schools, industrial schools, and reforma-
tories were considered without homes and "too old" for
orphanages. Advocates of these youth institutions felt
that without them the "dependent" youth would become
"depraved," "unprincipled;" girls would become "impure"
and grow up to "reproduce their kind three to five fold.2 3
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Any citizen could petition the court to inquire into the
alleged dependency of a child; and if adjudged dependent
the child could be committed to an industrial school
until (s)he reached a set maximum age unless discharged
sooner.
The reformatory plan incorporated imprisonment as
a way to (1) remove delinquents from their environments
for their own protection and place them in "guarded
sanctuaries of love, guidance, firmness, restraint;"
(2) reform the delinquent; therefore, sentences were
to be indeterminate as an incentive to the delinquent
to participate voluntarily in his (her) own reformation;
(3) to segregate youthful offenders from the corruptive
influences of adult criminals4 (15.) "punish only as is
good for the punished person." Delinquents were
assigned to reformatories without trial and with few
legal requirements. The lack of due process was
"justified" by claiming that the intention of reforma-
tories was reformation and not punishment.
By 1899, the increased use of legislation to obtain
humanitarian social ends, the growing disapproval of the
traditional criminal law practice of treating children
over seven as criminals, and the mounting number of
specialized correctional facilities for dealing with
youthful criminals were trends, all of which helped to
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bring about the establishment of the juvenile court in
America. By 1917, Massachusetts and all but three other
states had juvenile courts. Children charged with law
violations were to be treated with the same individ-
ualized assistance as dependent children and not to be
treated as criminals. Protection and rehabilitation of
the child were to replace indictment and punishment.
Overcrowding, mismanagement, inadequate financing,
and staff-hiring problems were leading to the dimise of
the reformatory concept. By the 1940's reformatories
were being supplemented by "treatment facilities," many
of which were maximum security institutions. The
rational for treatment centers is based on the idea of
separating the treatment functions of the juvenile
justice system from that of adjudication. This concept
originated with the Model Youth Authority Act.25 The
goals were treatment and rehabilitation. But these were
not based on a "cottage system" as reformatories were;
and there was less emphasis, if any, on agricultural
or vocational training, which had become irrelevant in
the reformatories.
It was during the 1940's that legislation was
passed which required the diagnosis of each child
committed to the newly created Youth Service Board, and
which raised the criminal proceedings minimum age from
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seven to fourteen. Although it was being acknowledged
back in 1941 that the commitment of a child to a
training school, "though not regarded strictly for the
purpose of punishment, has elements of a disciplinary
nature closely related to punishment, "26 by 1969,
the Residential Treatment Unit at Oakdale, the
Juvenile Guidance Center in Bridgewater, and the
Lancaster Industrial School for girls, and the Lyman
School had become the mainstay of the Massachusetts
juvenile correction system.
The responsibility of supervision over the juvenile
justice system was taken from the trustees of state
primary and reform schools and given to the Youth Service
Board created in 1948. The Youth Service Board gave up
the responsibility to the Division of Youth Services in
the Department of Education in 1952. The division
itself was abolished and replaced by a separate
Department of Youth Services in the Executive Office in
1969. It was in 1969 that the juvenile justice system's
use of institutions began to be phased out and replaced
by a system which "purchased services" for youth
individually from private agencies and organizations,
and incorporated community volunteer services, and was
of a more social service-delivery orientation. The
old methods of juvenile "reformation" had come under
19
harsh criticism, and the 1969 legislation calling for the
reorganization of the juvenile justice system bureau-
cracy and replacement of the old system was passed in
response to (a) the growing public attention received
by crime statistics (growing alarm over crime rates,
the majority committed by repeat offenders, some adult
offenders were in youth "reformatories" when children);
(b) the civil rights movement and the upsurge of
interest in the legal rights of poor persons; (there
was a disproportionate representation of minorities in
prison; and civil rights groups felt that imprisonment
served the ulterior motives of the power groups.
Prisoners rights became an issue - prisoners said
"rehabilitation" was nonexistent or irrelevant, and
ex-prisoners did not seem to "reintegrate" into
society); (c) heightened community awareness of the
baneful problems of youth and their families.
Children who committed status offenses as well as
those who violated state or local laws were processed
as delinquents through the juvenile justice system and
came under the jurisdiction of DYS regardless of their
individual circumstances; even though many status of-
fenders shared like circumstances with children who
were neglect and abuse or poverty cases and who were
handled separately by the Department of Public Welfare
20
(DPW). (The DPW had absorbed the functions of the State
Board of Charities, except for probational duties, in the
1930's.)
In 1973 the state legislature delegated a new legal
status for children, that of "child in need of services"
to replace the label of "wayward" or "delinquent"
for the status offender, and delegating responsibility
for "CHINS" to the DPW agency DFCS. The 1973 CHINS Act
again extended authority of a single state agency DFCS
over both "needy" children and certain of those
children who before the act were labeled "delinquents"
(status offenders). But this time the responsibilities
was for more than providing probation services, the
responsibility was comprehensive in the providing of
services.
In the beginning the whole of Massachusetts
juvenile justice system was based on English common
law which held a child of seven or more years and an
adult to be equally responsible criminally. Punish-
ment served the sole purpose of retribution. And as
until the 1840's, the offender bore full responsibility
for his crime (no sense of "diminished responsibility"
was considered) no need was perceived for a distinct
"juvenile" justice.
As the causes of crime began to be perceived in
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the 1840's as being not imminent so much to an offender
as being mostly a product of the environment, the idea
of the reformatory was conceived as a form of punish-
ment which had the function of not only retribution
(supposedly a very minor aspect) but of "rehabilitation."
The training schools began to take on an aspect of
deterrence because it was felt that older city youth
without "proper" family and home woul commit crimes
otherwise mature into "undesireables" if not placed in
a training school. These goals of deterrence and
rehabilitation never claimed to completely replace the
simple goal of retribution until the 1960's.
A form of juvenile probation service in 1869 was
another step in the recognition of a delinquent youth
apart from an adult offender and in the development
of a separate system of justice, that being for juveniles.
With the proliferation of the corrective institutions,
the establishment of the juvenile court, and the
supervision of the correction system formalized (at
first training schools had no state authority),
Massachusetts then had a system of justice for juveniles
distinct from that of adults. With the development of
a separate system of justice was the development of an
inequitable legal status for children in the form of
status offenses and lack of due process. State care
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of "needy" children and "delinquent" children was again
divided up as the probation duties of the State Board
of Charities were replaced by those of the Youth
Service Board, and the welfare duties of the State
Board of Charities were absorbed by the Department of
Public Welfare.
So in summary the CHINS Act was an acknowledgment
of (1) the current attitude that statutory laws were
unfair; status offenders should not suffer the stigma of
legal offenders (delinquents); (2) the opinion that a
"welfare" background is responsible for crime, and in
this case, status offenses; here, punishment is thought
only in terms of future deterrence: status offenders
meeting criteria for DFCS aid could be diverted from the
juvenile justice system. Other youth offenders were plac-
ed with DYA and were still thought of as deserving the
stigma of legal offenders although often the ultimate
"punishment" was little or no different from the
"treatment" or "aid" received by the CHINS with DFCS.
How it is decided which youthful offenders deserved the
"delinquent" stigma may seem arbitrary, but it is this
very arbitrariness which allows the system to continue
without resolving the dilemma of whether to pursue a
policy of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.
23
In the following chapters we see how the
Massachusetts laws regarding children give substance
to the dilemma.
Chapter 3
"How Massachusetts State Laws Reflect the Histor-
ical and Present Day Attitudes Toward Punisbment
and Stigmatization of Delinquent Dependent
Children"
Chapter 119 ("Public Welfare: Protection of Child-
ren and Proceedings Against Them") of Massachusetts
General Laws cites the reasons for the state's interest
in the plight of dependent children: among the primary
goals of the State are (1) strengthening and encouraging
the institution of the family for the protection and
care of children; (2) assisting and encouraging "the
use by any family of all available resources to this end;"
(3) providing "substantial care of children only when the
family itself or the resources available to the family
are unable to provide the necessary care and protection
to assure the rights of any child to sound health, and
normal physical, mental, spiritual, and moral develop-
ment. "27 It is from these goals that the juvenile court,
as representative of the state, assumes the role of
parens patriae in exercising its authority over delin-
quents (for the purpose of "the care, treatment, and
training of juvenile delinquents") as well as dependent
children.
The proceedings which are to be followed in
responding to children brought before the court in
25
child neglect/abuse cases or on allegations of having
committed status offenses or having broken laws are
specified in Chapter 119. These proceedings were amend-
ed in 1973 2 to correct the adverse effect on "Children
in Need of Services" ("CHINS")2 9 which, prior to the
amendment, the law regarded as either "neglected, or
abused," "wayward," or "delinquent." The purpose of
this new classification "CHINS" was to prevent need-
less stigmatization of status offenders by their being
labeled "wayward" or "delinquent" or by their pene-
trating too early or too deeply into the formal juvenile
justice system. It was felt that a large number of
these status offenders were youth reacting negatively to
maleficent home environments, who if treated as if
they were expected to be delinquents, as the State
previously did by practice, would, after having been
through juvenile judicial process, exhibit the
expected delinquent behavior. The guiding principle
which brought about the change in the law seemed to be
the one stated in this excerpt from Chapter 119:30
Care, custody, and discipline of the
children brought before the court shall
approximate as nearly as possible that
which they should receive from their
parents, and that, as far as practicable,
they shall be treated not as criminals,
but as children in need of aid, encour-
agement, and guidance...
26
the State's duty is "to protect against the harmful
effects resulting from ... inability, inadequacy or
destructive behavior of .. parent substitutes."
And in this case, the juvenile justice system which
took custody of the status offenders were the parent
substitutes accused of exhibiting inadequate or
destructive behavior.
In effect, because the criminal nature of status
offenses is nonexistent, the delinquent or "criminal"
stigma had to be "removed" from children adjudicated
as status offenders. Though acknowledgement of the
retributive aspect of the juvenile correction system
is minimized, the court and DYS are the organs by
which the State officially censures offenders, and in-
herent in any response by the court and DYS is an "offend-
er" stigma which is retributive in nature. By no
longer considering "punishment " but deterrence e se
as regards status offenders, the role of the juvenile
justice system loses much of its relevance. Therefore,
for CHINS, it seems more practicable that responsibility
for them be relegated to a state agency already set up
to provide services under such sanction as is given to
providing for the state's disadvantaged. It is more
practicable that this responsibility be relegated to
DFCS. For the offenses committed by CHINS are more
27
thought to be symstoms of a social malady remediable
by state action is individual cases31 than thought
to be wrongs against society which call for redress or
which can be deterred through the fear of and the
actuality of punishment.
However, under Chapter 119 an adjudged CHINS
is not necessarily given the same consideration of
neglect/abuse cases. Often, status offenders (CHINS)
are still referred to DYS for the specific purpose of
placement in individual foster care. The law does
allow the judge, probation officer, etc. discretion
in the choice of charges against a juvenile. If a
child is brought before the court under arrest, it is
mandatory that a petition be issued.3 This petition
must state whether the child is being charged as being
CHINS or delinquent,33 however, the discretion is in
whether the arresting officer reports a petty thief
as a runaway, truant, etc. instead of as a law-breaker
or delinquent. 2
The conflict between the desire to- view status
offenses or CHINS as problems to be dealt with by
social agencies so designated, as, for example,
delinquent tax payers are dealt with by the IRS, the
State's intolerance toward the commission of status
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offenses (which is in mien the same as that toward
criminal acts) is brought about by the specification
that an alleged CHINS may be brought before the court
on arrest if the arresting officer believes it could
be defined as a CHINS but is unlikely to respond to a
summons.
What is interesting is that a child alleged to
be CHINS is tried for circumstances and not for an act
perpetrated by him. The question of will or intent in
regards to a specified deed, as in the case of a
delinquent or adult offender, is not addressed by the
court. The home environment is what is tried; and if
found lacking, the possible dispositions are the same
options given a court when trying a case of neglect/
abuse or parents' inability or inadequacy to care for a
child: (1) prescribe medical, psychological,
psychiatrical, educational, occupational and/or social
services, and for supervision by a court clinic or by
any public or private organization providing counselling
or guidance services, and permit the child to remain
with relative or any adult designated by the court, or
any private organization either authorized by law to
receive and provide care for such children or deemed
by the court to be capable of bearing such responsibility
for the child; (3) commit the child to DFCS. 35 The
29
DPW (of which DFCS is the office ultimately responsi-
ble for the CHINS cases) has to accept on commitment
from any juvenile court or juvenile session of a
court any child under sixteen years declared to be
in need of foster care or to be a CHINS.3 6 This
statute is backed by "Title IV" of the federal govern-
ment's Social Security Act (which regulates state
welfare offices receiving funds), Part B , Sec. 2
regarding mandatory services which must be provided
to all appropriate persons:
(c) (1) services which supplement or
substitute for parental care and super-
vision for the purpose of eventing;
remedying or assisting in the solution
of problems which may result in the
neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delin-
quency of children.
(Emphasis added.) Under the Social Security Act the
federal government provides 50 - 75% of the funding
for most of the state's welfare.
The difference between the State's perception of
CHINS and its perception of delinquents is that CHINS
misbehavior is symptomatic of an environment needing
substitution, correction, or adaption toward them;
while delinquent behavior, and behavior of those few
status offenders and CHINS who are referred to DYS, is
symtomatic of the individual needing readapting or
rehabilitation towards society.
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Chapter 120 is entitled the "Care and Training of
Juvenile Delinquents." It delineates the authority and
responsibilities and limits of the state agency
(authorized by the chapter) which is primarily responsi-
ble for those children adjudicated delinquent by the courts.
The agency so authorized is DYS. Sec. 5 of Chapter 120
lists the responsibilities of DYS, and sections 6 and
6A of Chapter 1073 prescribe the means by which DYS is
to correct "the socially harmful tendencies" of a person
comitted to it: 37 (1) upon receiving a child committed
to it, by rules established by DYS, examine and study
child and investigate all pertinent circumstances of his
life and behavior; (2) reexamine all persons within its
custody, except those on parole or in foster homes,
periodically at intervals not exceeding one year in
length; the bureau of clinical services must assess
the rehabilitative progress of any child that was com-
mitted to DYS for having committed a status offense
(truancy, runaway, stubborn child, wayward), and must
report this information so that the committing court
can review the case, and determine whether the child's
needs can be best met by continuing him in the same
institution, or by making a new order; (3) keep written
records of all exams, conclusions, and orders concerning
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disposition or treatment of every person under its
control; 38 (4i)have discretion to permit child
liberty under supervision, and require such modes of
life and conduct as seems best adapted to fit him for
return to full liberty without danger to the public;
(5) order his confinement as it believes best for the
protection of the public, or reconfinement or renewed
release; (6) require participation by him in vocational,
physical, educational, and corrective training and
activities; (7) provide such medical and psychiatrical
treatment as is necessary; (8) revoke or modify an
order, except an order of final discharge; (9) discharge
him from control with notice to the court.3 9
The amount of criminal responsibility borne by
the child varies with the offense, and as the amount of
responsibility varies, so does the function of "punish-
ment". For most CHINS who have committed status offenses,
there is no punishment per so: that their personal
involvement in a wrong against society is not what the
State is responding to. However, for most delinquents,
the punishment is "rehabilitation" with retributive
overtones. In the case of a juvenile violating a motor
vehicle law, punishment may take the form of restitution
or a fine (not exceeding the amount of fine authorized
by such law violation) in addition to the other
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dispositions at the court's option.40 In this case,
if the juvenile defies a court order which specifies
fine and/or restitution in addition to another
disposition, he bears the full weight of the conse-
quencies; as he may be arrested, and the abstracts of
all adjudications and dispositions may be used by the
motor vehicle registry against the child in proceedings
for the revocation or restoration of the child's
driver's license or for the motor vehicle insurance
covering the vehicle operated by the child, or in any
action of tort arising out of the negligent operation
of the motor vehicle by the youth, as such could be
used against an adult. 4 And in other cases, if the
complaint alleges that a law was broken about which
the court feels it would be more in the public's
interest for the child to be tried for that offense
or violation, the court may dismiss the delinquency
case. No criminal proceedings may be begun against a
person who commits an offense prior to his 17th
birthday, unless first delinquency proceedings have
been begun and dismissed. Neither an adjudged delinquert
nor an adjudged CHINS may be committed by the court to
any jail, house of correction, or any state-supported
institution for the custody, care, and training of
delinquents. Commitment of a delinquent child to DYS,
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gives DYS the authority to place him in a facility
specifically operated for the purpose of custody, care,
and treatment of delinquents. A CHINS may not be placed
in such a facility, but the law does not preclude
placement of CHINS in a facility shared by youth ad-
judged to be delinquent.
The most preferred residential placement outside
of foster care is group home placement, which, most
typically, is shared by both CHINS and delinquent
youth. In Chapter 4., we look at a case study of two
group homes, both shared by delinquents and CHINS,
serving the functions of "rehabilitative punishment"
and "providing substitute care for the socially
disadvantaged" simultaneously.
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Chapter 4
"Group Homes: Where Stigma and Non-Stigma-
tization Try to Live With Each Other"
The law and policy-makers of recent years claim
their aim is to mitigate stigmatization in the juvenile
judicial/correction process. "Stigmatization" is per-
ceived as having negative effects in "reformation";
the possibility of its having a positive role in
juvenile correction is not considered. Chapter 119
gives the court discretion in referring or committing
a child to either DFCS or DYS. DYS feels the referral
program exists to "divert youngsters from further
entry into the juvenile justice system by providing
them with types of care which offer the promise of
redirecting their delinquent behavior. Referral also
avoids stigmatizing youths without DYS commitment
record."4 Because of an overstrained budget, DFCS has
a policy of refusing referred delinquents, since DYS
is an agency which can provide for them. Neither do
the courts usually refer a CHINS to DYS for placement
in foster care. It seems that the immediate effect upon
the child is little different whether he is referred or
committed to DYS; the difference is on paper and what
possible future effects that record may have; the
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services provided by DYS are the same for both referred
and committed.
The group home is considered by both DYS and DFCS,
who are given primary responsibility by state law for
delinquent and dependent children, as one way of satis-
fying its charges: that of "rehabilitative punishment"
without stigmatization for DYS and that of servicing
the socially deprived" for DFCS. Because (1) the law
does seek to make a distinction between the youth, yet
it imposes the condition of mitigating stigmatization
in both cases, and (2) the group home in a facility
where the fallacies of the law regarding the two sets
of youth become more apparent because of the proximity
of the two groups and the dual function of the home
make comparisions easier, I chose the group home as that
part of the juvenile justice/welfare system on which I
would focus.
What are the implications of this dual role for
the group home? Is it being suggested that children
with problems of maleficent family situations or who are
emotionally disturbed, and/or are status offenders
(i. e. CHINS) are equivalent to delinquents who may also
have these problems but are DYS instead of DFCS)? For
if the two sets of children are not differentiated
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within the group home, the "rehabilitative punishment"
is the same as the "substitute care" and/or social
services provided CHINS; the distinction made between
being a CHINS and being delinquent, and being
sponsored by DYS or by DFCS at the time of writing the
petition and at adjudication loses its significance.
But if the two sets of children are differentiated
within the group home, can a staff in such a facility
shared by the two sets of youth play the double role?
Is there a difference made by the agencies between
CHINS (DFCS) youths and delinquents? Given that
stigma is inherent in such a situation, who is stigma-
tized, and how is this stigma manifested? How does
the law contribute to stigmatization? These are the
questions I am attempting to answer.
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METHODOLOGY
I attempted to find answers to these questions by
use of the personal interview and observation. The
measures I used are:
1. the profile of the "typical" youth and his
background;
2. the services provided by each agency to its
respective clientele within a group home;
3. the amounts and sources of funding for major
services at the department level and at the
level of the individual recipient;
4. the process for receiving services provided
by each state agency; and whether they are
initiated by the state or by the recipient.
I made up two questionaires for use as guides in
my interviews at the DYS, DFCS, and Office for Children
offices and group homes. I limited the number of group
homes in the study to two, which were chosen because of
their accessibility physically and the familiarity
I have with the homes themselves.4 3
Of the group homes, one is a home for girls of
ages twelve to eighteen years, and for exceptions,
extended to twenty-one years, Somerville D.A.R.E; the
other is a home for boys twelve to eighteen years old,
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Hastings House. Hastings House prides itself as being
a program for "hard-core" youth and on its success rate
for "resocializing" the youth who have come through the
program. Most of its residents are DYS clients, while
only two or three are DFCS clients out of the thirteen
residents in the home. Somerville D.A.R.E. is a home
for eighteen young women of whom three-fourths are DFCS
clients and the remaining quarter is made up of court--
referred, private, or DYS clients. Both are affiliated
with Dynamic Action Residence Enterprise, Inc. (D.A.R.E.)
which is a corporation of autonomous group homes,
resident schools, day programs, and camps for delinquent
and maladjusted youth. D.A.R.E. serves the homes, et al.
as a fund-raising unit, financial manager, and resource
of professional advice and personnel.
The interviews were with staff personnel within the
homes and with representatives of DYS and of DFCS in
their downtown offices. The residents of the home were
not interviewed unless present at time of interview with
staff member, and then only as part of observation data.
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FINDINGS
Is there a difference made by the agencies be-
tween CHIN6 (DFCS) youth and delinquents? For
comparable characteristics of their clientele as
shown in Table 1, DFCS and DYS provide remarkably
similar services (see tables 2 and- 3). The difference
between the DYS and DFCS youth seems to be made in
the manner of service delivery. At the girls' home it
was thought that DYS' budget is not handled well, and
because of this, financial problems and funding
situations have priority, interfering with DYS case-
workers getting involved personally with the girls.
This affects group home placement. Group home placement
is felt to be productive only on a long-term basis; but
in that it is unpredictable when DYS funds for a
particular girl will "run out," DYS girls are often
"pulled" from a group home to be placed in a less costly
situation without a study of more substantive reasons
for terminating placing.
Differences in the provision of basic need services
such as clothing allowance, medical bills et cetera are
changing now with cost of purchase of the slots in
group homes including a clothing allowance, et cetera
preset by the group home. The group home has identical
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rates for all residents. However, until the change is
fully instituted, the DFCS maximum individual clothing
allowances average approximately fifty dollars a year
greater than the maximum of those of comparable DYS
cases. The clothing allowance from DFCS is adminis-
tered automatically on a quarterly basis, in the form
of a cash grant to the recipient or check to the store
of purchaser's choice. Clothing allowance from DYS
is administered by need only (group home has to
initiate the issuance of the voucher), and in the form
of a voucher for stores preselected by DYS.
Any additional funds that may be required, as for
unexpected medical expenses, are acquired through-a
voucher system at DYS. One has to apply for special
through the legal department at DYS; medical, clothing,
etc. additional funds have to come from the same
special fund. DFCS has access to federal "emergency"
funds set up specifically for medical or clothing, etc.
Somerville D.A.R.E. found that school placements
and obtaining funds for particular school placements
were affected. This usually is because the most de-
sireable school placement may require additional funds
not already provided by initial agreement with the
agency. DFCS has a procedure for applying for such
funds; but DYS, with an already complicated system for
4l
administering agreed upon funds, has no or little
additional funds for such a situation. Hastings House
found that procurement of certain individual needs for
the boys (winter clothing, school equipment, etc.) on
an equitable basis was affected because funding not
only varies by agency, but also by regions within an
agency.
Table I. Comparison of DYS Clientele and DFCS Clientele
DYS4 DFCS45
Committed come from
families at, or near,
the poverty level ....88%
Committed come from
broken homes ......... 33.3%
Committed have one or
both parents suffer-
ing from a serious
alcohol or narcotics
problem ..............60%
Of DYS caseload are
court referred, 46despite a maximum
of 10% who are
committed being
characterized as
dangerous ........... 23%
Come from families at,
or near, the poverty
level............*...60%
Come from broken
homes ...............
Are placed because
parent(s) mentally
ill **..*.*.* 23%
>Are placed because
of neglect, abuse
or inadequate
homes. *.......... 13.6%
Have behavorial/
emotional pro-
blems ........... 13%
Table II. Services47 Provided by DYS
1. Diagnostic screening
2. Placement - a. Residential treatment - youth is
placed in a residential program
and services purchased for-her
such as individual counseling,
group therapy, individual psy-
chiatric therapy, medical and
dental care, family counseling,
and educational services.
b. Group homes - youth who are not
allowed to live at home may be
placed in group homes, receiving
supportive services such as
tutoring, referrals to public
schools, and limited clinical
treatment.
c. Specialized boarding schools -
specialized educational services
for children with physical handi-
caps, learning disabilities, or
emotional problems.
d. Boarding schools.
e. Residential camps - social services
in a camp setting.
f. Foster care - (1) Placement in
private home with regional DYS staff
providing limited casework services.
(2) Private placement agency provides
administrative and social services.
3. Provision of nonresidential services -
a. Day school programs and alternative
schools which focus on learning
disabilities.
b. Recreational programs.
L.3
Table II. Continued. Services4 7Provided by DYS
0. Individual counseling.
d. *Big Sister", "Big Brother,"
and other volunteer services.
*. Employment opportunities and
job banks.
f. Drop-in centers.
.. Provision of secure settings for "dangerous"
youth - "intensive care"
Table III. Services Provided by DFCS
1. Diagnostic screening.
2. Placement (See descriptions above.)
a. Residential treatment.
b. Group homes.
c. Specialized boarding schools.
d. Foster care.
3. Provision of nonresidential services.
a. Day care programs.
b. Information and referral services.
e. Transportation services (for handi-
capped and elderly).
d. Provision to at-home clients of
medical services, services for the
mentally retarded, educational
services, Drug Addiction Service,
Alcoholic Service
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Who is stigmatized, and how is this stigma mani-
fested?
For both delinquent and status offenders, the
first condition under the definition of stigmatization
is met by the court process and adjudication as either
delinquent or CHINS. The second condition is also
met for DYS youth. For uniformity of the offense, and
perpetrator must be emphasized in order to justify
a program of rehabilitation or of reformation for
delinquents. This second condition is not met in the
case of CHINS. It is the very dissimilarity of the
offense and offender which justifies a child being
declared a CHINS. DFCS is supposed to provide those
essentials of the environment which were lacking; and
consequently the lacking of these "essentials, not
the child, which are to account for the perpetration
of the offense. The third, fourth, and fifth condi-
tions are met by the police, court, DYS, DFCS, and
group home personnel.
DFCS youth at Hastings House seem to have a
difficult time adjusting because of their resentment
at being like those youth who are regarded as
delinquents. They have a fear of being thought of as
delinquent. The few DFCS youth without the "I'm
not a delinquent." attitude (as one staff member
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phrased it), showed a negative change in behavior after
initial exposure to the DYS boys. This was nearly
always a temporary change. But DFCS youth seldom leave
the program successfully, and they usually leave
voluntarily because of the reputation of Hastings House
as being a home for delinquents. Staff members account
for this by saying that the rigid program 4which is
hard anyway, makes them (DFCS boys) feel they have
been lowered in status."
How does the law contribute to such stigmatization?
As mentioned in the preceding question, the adjudication
process is a part of the stigmatization process. How-
ever, some of the inequity of service delivery to CHINS
and delinquents by the two state agencies can be attri-
buted to the law calling for two departments which
compete for funds from one state budget to provide
essentially the same services to sets of youth which with-
in the homes themselves are not very different (confer
appendix).
CONCLUSION
It seems apparent that one of the homes is resentful
of DYS because tensions created by financial difficulties.
The other home made no complaint about the financial sit-
uation at DYS. I think this brings up several things that
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should be looked into: (1) The similarity of needs
(of. Tables I - III) between DYS kids and DFCS kids
is striking. There are two agencies providing
essentially the same services to children who seem to
have essentially the same needs. But affiliation with
the agency (DYS) can affect the child's acceptance
outside of DYS by a private agency like Sommerville
D.A.E. because of a reluctance to deal with
"delinquentsU because of the financial turmoil at DYS.
The intolerance of a home such as Somerville D.A.R.E.
compared to the air of resignation at Hastings House
the higher expectation engendered by primarily dealing
with DPCS which is social welfare and expecting the
same of DYS, which I believe has financial difficulties
in part due to a political stigma of setting aside
"too much" money for delinquents and not enough for the
poor deserving youth. Hastings House which deals
primarily with DYS and delinquents, is much more resigned
to the lower priority and status that social welfare
assigns to delinquents. (2) The stigma of being
delinquent is so prevalent, that "non-stigmatization"
by such placements in group homes is not possible as
long as the state insists on labeling certain juveniles
delinquent (despite strikingly similar backgrounds to
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those of CHINS and placing them in situations with
CHINS where the disparity of comparable delivery
services is salient to view. (3) CHINS who are
placed in facilities shared by delinquents may come
to feel they also share the stigma of being delin-
quent.
It seems that the effort to rid the stigma, a
stigma credited with inhibiting delinquency
prevention or delinquent rehabilitation, attached
status offenders is subordinate to the aim of retri-
bution and the juvenile justice system, although
this is denied by the State. It is because of the
denial and yet actions to the contrary, that CHINS
status offenders and delinquents have the added pro-
blem of uncertain and seemingly arbitrary status.
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FOOTNOTES
1
"Seeondary deviation" refers to "a special class
of socially defined responses which people make to
problems created by the societal reactions to their devi-
ance." Edwin M. Lemert, "The Concept of Secondary
Deviation", Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social
Control, 1967, p. 40.
2
"Dependent" is a euphemism for an unsupervised
child, or a child without a legal guardian or proper
abode, or a child who is poor, neglected, or abused.
3 Radzinovitz and Wolfgand (eds.), Crime and
Justice Vol. II: The Criminal in the Arms of the Law.,
1971, p. 21.
4 H. B. Acton, (ed.), The Philosophy of Punishment,
A Collection of papers, 1969, p. 65.
5Harold Garfinkel, "Condions of Successful
Degradation", Hazelrigg's Prison Within Society.
Degradation is defined as the alteration of total
identity. c.f. Lemert's article on socialization and
the redefinition of one's self as deviant, Crime and
Justices Vol. I: The Criminal in Socey Rabinlowit
and Wolfgand, editors.
6 c.f. Anthony M. Quinton, "On Punishment, : The
Philosophy of Punishment.
7c.f. Morris R. Cohen, "Moral Aspects of Punishment,
"Crime and Justice, Vol. II.
8c.f. C. W. Mundle, "Punishment and Desert", The
Philosophy of Punishment.
9 This theory justifies "punishment" as a process of
restoring an individual to a useful and constructive
place in society through some form of vocational,
correctional, and/or therapeutic retraining.
1 0Morris R. Cohen, op. cit., p. 30.
11c.f. C. S. Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, "Crime and Justice, Vol. II.
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12 Bernard Rosenquet, H. B. Acton's Philosophy, p. 12.
1 3Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention
of Delinquency, 1969, p. 15. Also footnote 6--c.f. T. H.
Green, in Acton's Philosophy, who feels that punish-
ment is just to the extent necessary to maintain the
rights of all. By associating violation of rights with
the terror of punishment, the importance of rights is
emphasized and their maintenance is strengthened. The
degree of terror should be in proportion to the degree
of importance of the rights which are violated.
1 4William Kneale, "The Responsibility of Criminals,"
Acton's Philosophy, p. 29.
15youth shared the same correctional facilities and
punishments as adults. They were arrested, put into
prison indicted by the grand jury, tried by a petit
jury, 'under all the forms and technicalities of our
criminal law"; and if found guilty, they were punished
by the state. c.f. Lela B. Costin, "The Child and the
Court," Child Welfare: Policies and Practice 1972 p. 92.
1 6cf. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, Justice for the
Child, 1962, p. 23.
1 7 Dependent children were defined as those who beg
or receive alms while vending or under pretense of
vending; or who, for the purpose of begging or receiv-
ing alms, frequent any street, alley, or place; or who
had no permanent home, proper parental care or guardian-
ship, or sufficient means of substance; or who associ-
ates with reputed thieves or criminals or undesireables;
or who is found in a house of ill-repute or in a poor
house. of. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, Justice for the
Child,
18Anthony Platt, loc. cit., p. 54-110o.
1 9This was the first form of juvenile probation
service in Massachusetts. of. Lela B. Costin, loc cit.,
p. 95-6. Private families who took the initiative
of taking dependent or delinquent children into their
homes had to notify the State Board of Charities and
Lunacy, and private boarding homes for infants had to
be registered with and licensed by the board. By 1892,
the state Board of Charities was assuming the role of
parens patriae. Parens patriae is a principle which
can be stated as "children who are under the court are
subject to its discipline and entitled to its protection;
therefore, the state may intervene in his behalf to
safeguard him from any harm and to enforce legal
obligations of others in relation to him."
20 cf. M. D. Hill, Practical Suggestions to the
Founders of Reformatory Schools (1065); Suggestions
for the Repression of Grime (1857); Journal of ard
Visit to the Convict Gaois, Refuges and Reformatories
of Dublin, (1b65).
2 1 Founder of free schools for poor children, and
reformatories for boys and for girls. cf. J. Estlin
Carpenter, Life and Work of Mary Carpenter, (1879).
2 2Lela B. Costin, loc. cit., p. 92.
2 3 cf. Anthony Platt, Ibid., p. 110
4Anthony Platt, Ibid. p. 15.
2 5 cf. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, Justice for the
Child.
2 6cf. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 119,
annotated ed., 1969.
2 7 Ibid. , sec. 1, 1969.
28Ibid., Chapter 1073, 1973.
29A "Child in Need of Services" is a child below
the age of seventeen who persistently runs away from
the home of his parents or that of his legal guardian,
or who persistently refuses to obey the lawful and
reasonable demands of his parents or legal guardian,
thereby resulting in said parent's or guardian's
inability to adequately care for and protect said
child, or a child between the ages of six and sixteen
who persistently and willfully fails to attend
school or persistently violates the lawful and
reasonable regulations of his school." Thus, the
label "wayward" and "stubborn child" could be dis-
carded.
30 1bid., Chapter 119, sec 53 and sec., 1969.
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3 1This state action would be in the form of making
available those social services intended to discourage
a child's further delinquency and or dependency by
changing his home environment (including possible
removal from home of his parent or guardian).
3 2Massachusetts General Laws, Annotated, Chapter
19. sec. 39H, 1969.
331bid., see. 55. 1969.
*"Delinquentg is defined as having broken any
state statute, city ordinance, or town by-law, or any
statute or law pertaining to the regulation of motor
vehicles not punishable by a death or a fine of more
than $100.00. A petition alleging delinquency can
only apply to a child between the ages of seven and
seventeen years. If the seventeenth birthday occurs
after commission of the offense but apprehension
occurs before the eighteenth birthday, or the child
turns eighteen during the time pending hearing,
adjudication, or determination of appeals, all
provisions and rights applicable to a child under
seven shall apply to such child.
35Mass. Gen. Laws Annot., loc. cit., sec 37G, 1969.
36Ibid., sec. 23D., 1969.
3 7 Ibid., seos. 5-6A.
38 Ibid. , Chapter 1073, sec. 21. Failure to
examine or reexamine a person committed to the board,
entitles person to petition committing court for an
order of discharge, and court will discharge person if
DYS does not satisfy court of necessity for further
control.
3 9Responsibilities enumerated (4) through (9) are
given in Chapter 1073, secs. 6 and 6A. Children
committed to DYS are not committed for a pre-specified
length of time but are considered to be on parole and
retain this status until they are eighteen years old.
"In this way DYS is still able to purchase follow-up
services for the child and may, if necessary, provide
additional services in the future without going
through the court process again." cf. "Department
of Youth Services: How DYS is Organized," Department
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of Youth Services, Boston, 1973, p. 4.
40The exceptional cases being alleged violations
of any provision of Chapter 89 or 90 which is not
punishable by imprisonment or by a ine of not more
than $100.00 or of any law regulating the operation
of motor vehicles. Mass. Gen. Laws Annot., Chapter
.1,sea. 74.
1 Mass. Gen. Laws Annot., Chapter 119, sec. 58B,
1969.
"A Strategy for Youth in Trouble,'M DYS, Boston,
1972, p. 10.
I was affiliated with D.A.R.E. for seven months
as a volunteer counselor in a third group home in
proximity to these two. In earlier papers I have
used information aoquired from my own visits and
interviews and from evaluation studies by a DYS team
to which I had access.
4Ibid., p. 3.
45Foster Home Care in Mass.: A Study of Foster
Care..., Alan R. druber, Gov. domssion on Adopt on
and Foster Care, Boston, 1973, pp. 73-75.
46
"'A StrategyP" p. 9. Judges, probation officers
and DYS staff differ in their estimates, but the hig t
estimate of persons familiar with youthful offenders
was 10% of all DYS commitments.
47Certain educational services provided through
the agency, regardless of services provided through
the agency, regardless of services provided by group
home or foster care, are under the auspices of Title I
and are federally funded. A child is placed in a
group care situation where all needs will be met in
placement. Casework services, administration and
social services (psychiatric therapy and counseling,
and or casework) is provided by or procured by DYS
for foster care placements.
48About the placement problems which the girls
complained, DYS feels that their girls who really need
group home therapy are considered by the homes to be
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too "high-risk, hard-core", and that girls' homes
such as Somerville D.A.R.E. are reluctant to accept
them.
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APPENDIX
Are there general characteristics among the resi-
dents which vary along the lines of the "type" of
youth usually associated with DYS, or with DFCS? DYS boys
are ihighly institutionalized." Staff at the boys'
home feel that DFCS youth are very seldom so, having
fewer and less harsh brushes with the law. At the
girls' home the difference is seen to be only
initially present. The "attitude of institutionali-
zation" DYS girls have wears away in time.
Is there a difference in orientation and adjustment
problems? Resident-resident relationships at
Somerville D.A.R.E. are not affected so much, DYS
girls and DFCS girls get along with each other. But
staff-resident relationships involving DYS girls are
very trying. The majority of the girls are not DYS,
and it is felt that due to majority attitude prevailing
and the effects of a "group home atmosphere," the
initial antipathy passes.
Are most of your youngsters eligible to attend
"regular" public schools? Only a small number of
Hastings House boys are in regular schools, because
of behavioral problems. Agency affiliation seem to
have no bearing on this trend. Hardly any of the
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girls at Somerville D.A.R.E. were ever behavioral
problems in school, and most are in regular school
now, the other being drop-outs or in night school.
This does not vary according to agency affiliation.
Do DYS and DFCS kids differ in ways of "acting
out" in the home? Somerville D.A.R.E. reported no
difference in the matter of "axting out" between
DFCS and DYS girls. At Hastings House they reported
a difference in intensity in that DFCS youth are not
as aggressive or destructive as DYS boys in their
"acting out".
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